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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are now more than sixty thousand multinational corporations 
operating in the world.1  This rapidly increasing number and the 
impressive global reach of corporations create connections among 
individuals such that the actions of any given corporation can be 
simultaneously felt all over the world.  Its consumers in the west, its 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington.  J.D., 
Harvard Law School, B.A., University of Michigan.  The author would like to thank the University of 
Cincinnati College of Law for hosting the symposium at which this Article was first presented, as well 
as Dean Donna Nagy, Professor Bert Lockwood, and Sean Arthurs for their invitation to participate 
therein.  In addition, she would like to express sincere gratitude to the following colleagues for their 
insightful comments at various stages of this Article’s completion:  Alfred Aman, Hannah Buxbaum, 
David Fidler, Luis Fuentes-Rowher, Ajay Mehrotra, David Weissbrodt, Cynthia Williams, Susan 
Williams, and Elizabeth Zoller.  Finally, the author thanks Josh Abel and Sean Santen for the invaluable 
contributions they made to this Article and Timothy Lynch for his unending support. 
 1. MEDARD GABEL & HENRY BRUNER, GLOBAL INC.: AN ATLAS OF THE MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATION 3 (2003). 
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laborers in the east, and people who depend on a clean environment 
across the globe can be affected by the decisions a given corporation 
makes. 
The interconnectedness of these various constituencies, created in part 
by corporations, has led us to understand that a subset of the problems 
created by business has an international character.  International 
solutions that ensure more responsive and responsible corporate actors 
are therefore necessary.  The global nature of transnational corporations, 
and the partially cosmopolitan identities formed in response to living in 
a globalized world, has thinkers the world over developing proposals for 
new or re-worked institutions, mechanisms, and frameworks for 
engaging the new conditions brought on by this individual and corporate 
trend toward a globalization of the corporation and cosmopolitanization 
of the self.  This Article will add to this literature, as it proposes that our 
changed condition should cause us to rethink the formation and function 
of customary international law (CIL). 
The proposal contained herein would also operate outside the context 
of corporate responsibility and would affect other discourse in which 
human rights are given the character of CIL.2  Still, it is a graceful 
coincidence that this Article will be published together with David 
Weissbrodt’s and Cynthia Williams’s most recent contributions to 
scholarship promoting corporate social responsibility in the international 
context, given that multinational corporations are among the most 
visible of modern-day human rights violators. 
The connection between the subject of this symposium—corporate 
social responsibility—and the proposal made herein regarding CIL most 
poignantly arises in the context of the hotly debated Alien Claims Tort 
Act (ATCA or the Act).3  Recent years have seen important 
developments in the resolution of ATCA cases.  In June 2004, the 
United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.4  In that opinion, the Court addressed whether the plaintiff, 
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, was entitled to recover damages under the 
ATCA.5  Although Sosa did not involve any corporate entities as 
defendants, the Court’s decision is highly relevant for corporations 
because of the now well-known use of the ATCA as a mechanism for 
seeking redress from corporations engaged in practices that violate basic 
 2. For a discussion of the CIL of human rights, see infra Section IV. 
 3. 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2005) (alternatively called the Alien Tort Statute by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and others). 
 4. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 5. Id. 
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human rights.6
The amicus curiae briefs filed in connection with Sosa, as well as the 
writings of many scholars who have studied the impact of ATCA 
litigation are evidence of the strong disagreements that have arisen in the 
nearly twenty-five years of litigation under the Act.  Similarly, the 
statements made in the immediate aftermath of Sosa by corporate 
entities and advocates of trade and corporate interests on one side7 and 
human rights advocates on the other8 predict continued disagreement 
regarding the proper scope of ATCA litigation.  What there seems little 
dispute over at this point, however, is that the Court’s decision in Sosa 
leaves corporations exposed to continued litigation under the ATCA as 
federal courts follow the Supreme Court’s guidance in identifying and 
defining actionable claims under the ATCA.9
One of the fundamental debates over ATCA litigation concerns the 
power of federal courts to incorporate CIL in their decisionmaking.10  
Litigation under the ATCA and in other areas of the law has led the 
federal courts and the Supreme Court into a public debate over the 
proper role of foreign and international law, including CIL, in our own 
decisionmaking process.11  In the dialogue over ATCA litigation, 
arguments to limit U.S. federal court employment of CIL have entailed 
narrowing preexisting understandings of the definition and role of 
CIL.12  The result of this narrowing, however, is perilous for the future 
of human rights litigation, including the future of litigation against 
 6. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Press Release, National Foreign Trade Council, NFTC and USA*Engage Cite U.S. 
Supreme Court Decision To More Narrowly Define Alien Tort Provision as Important Step In Curbing 
Erroneous Lawsuits (June 30, 2004), at http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp. 
 8. Human Rights First, Supreme Court Denies Claim of Alvarez-Machain, But Upholds 
Important Human Rights Law, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2004_alerts/ 
0629.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2005). 
 9. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
the lower-court’s definition of “actionable norms” under the ATCA). 
 10. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).  See also Harold 
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998), Gordon 
Christenson, Problems of Proving International Human Rights Law in U.S. Courts: Customary 
International Law in Domestic Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 225 (1995) and others. 
 11. In addition to the debate that occurs among the justices in dicta within opinions such as Sosa 
and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), individual members of the Court have engaged in this 
debate in public forums.  Justice Scalia’s address to the American Society of International Law in 2004 
is an example.  See ASIL Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting (2004).  Another includes a debate 
between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer held at American University on Jan. 13, 2005, a transcript of 
which is available at www.american.edu/media (follow the link “speeches on campus”). 
 12. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999).  See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10. 
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corporations violating basic human rights. 
Part II of this Article will briefly describe the history of litigation 
under the ATCA and describe some of the claims that have been brought 
against state actors as well as private individuals and corporations.13  
Because many volumes have previously been devoted to this history, the 
description in this Article will be cursory and experts on this litigation 
may prefer to proceed to Parts III and forward.  Part III will focus on the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 
Part IV of this Article will turn to a discussion of CIL.  It will first 
establish the difficulty scholars have had in determining the content of 
CIL and assert that this difficulty is due, in part, to a failure to recognize 
the role of individuals in the CIL formation process.  It will discuss 
changes in international law that have placed individuals at the center of 
the international law of human rights and residual notions of 
sovereignty.  These elements have resulted in a failure to recognize 
individuals as agents in the formation of the CIL of human rights despite 
recognition of this sort in the area of human rights treaty formation. 
The remainder of this Article will rely on social theory regarding 
identity formation and transformation in the context of globalization.  
Discussing this literature, Part V will aim to establish that identities, like 
so much else in the current age, have at least partially dislodged from the 
local and national and have taken on an international, global, or 
cosmopolitan aspect, due in no small part to the multi-nationalization of 
corporations. 
Building on the idea that individual identity is now partially 
cosmopolitan, Part VI will return to a discussion of CIL.  This Part will 
advance two core arguments.  First, it will draw attention to a particular 
deficit in adjudicatory machinery.  The cosmopolitanism discussed in 
Part V has created new opportunities and interconnectedness among 
people.  It has also led to problems that often require a keen awareness 
of the international quality of such problems and the international law 
available to address them.  The international aspect of many modern 
problems creates demands on existing judicial institutions to consider 
avenues for the adjudication of international concerns.  Properly 
conceptualized, CIL and the ATCA contribute to this project.  The 
second argument advanced herein addresses the concerns expressed by 
Professors Trimble,14 Goldsmith, Bradley, and Posner regarding judicial 
 13. Part II is a brief reiteration of material published previously by the author.  See Christiana 
Ochoa, Access to U.S. Federal Courts as a Forum for Human Rights Disputes:  Pluralism and the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 631 (2005). 
 14. Phillip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 
707–16 (1986). 
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application of CIL by federal courts as an anti-democratic practice.  This 
Article argues that their concern relies on an unnecessarily narrow 
definition of the role of courts in the democratic process and suggests 
that their concern can be alleviated in two parts.  First, many have 
previously addressed the role of federal courts in the democratic process.  
This Part will discuss the contributions others have made regarding the 
role of courts in democratic society through the promotion of dialogue 
over new or controversial issues.  This Article will build on this work to 
argue that the manner in which CIL is formed creates a responsibility on 
the part of each branch of government, including the judiciary, to engage 
with CIL in order to ensure that each nation’s citizens are fully 
represented in international lawmaking.  Courts cannot and should not 
abdicate their role in interpreting CIL, as this would diminish their 
traditional roles in the political process.  Second, Part VI will argue that 
curtailing avenues for U.S. participation in CIL formation and definition 
quashes participation on the part of U.S. citizens in the creation of CIL.  
Especially regarding the CIL of human rights, CIL depends on 
individual participation in order to ensure that it is adequately reactive to 
the exigencies created by globalization. 
Given that CIL does in fact exist, limiting participation on the part of 
federal courts in the identification and definition of CIL has the effect of 
limiting U.S. citizens’ participation in CIL’s evolving composition.  Part 
VII will discuss the ideal role of the judiciary in stimulating the 
formation of the CIL of human rights.  To deny the courts such a role is 
to deny the global aspects of individuals’ identities and is itself a 
limitation on democratic participation in international lawmaking. 
II.  LITIGATION UNDER THE ATCA 
In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
announced its decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.15  The plaintiff-
appellants were Paraguayan nationals who sought to convince the 
Second Circuit that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over a case 
involving a tort committed in Paraguay by the defendant, who was also a 
Paraguayan national.  According to the Filártigas, during the time Peña 
was the Inspector General of Police in Asunción, Paraguay, Peña 
kidnapped, tortured, and killed the Filártigas’ son and brother, Joelito 
Filártiga.  The plaintiffs alleged violations of “wrongful death statutes; 
the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the U.N. 
Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights 
 15. 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980). 
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and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and 
practices constituting the customary international law of human rights 
and the law of nations.”16  The plaintiffs relied on these documents as 
evidence of CIL prohibiting the treatment to which Joelito Filártiga was 
subjected.  In so doing, they hoped to show that the requirements for 
liability under the ATCA had been satisfied.17  The ATCA provides that 
the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”18  The Second Circuit decided in Filártiga 
that the ATCA “validly creates federal court jurisdiction for suits 
alleging torts committed anywhere in the world against aliens in 
violation of the law of nations.”19
Passed by the first Congress in 1789, the ATCA was rarely invoked 
until the Second Circuit breathed life into it through its decision in 
Filártiga.20  In the twenty-five years since, the Act has been at the center 
of a lively controversy over the use of the United States federal court 
system as a forum for settling the grievances of foreign nationals.21
During the past quarter century, multiple claims have been brought 
against actors public and private, foreign and domestic.  The Filártiga 
case and Kadic v. Karadzic22 are among the most well-known and 
perhaps the most emblematic of the cases in which foreign plaintiffs 
have sued foreign defendants.  In both cases, the plaintiffs found their 
defendant in the United States and were able to serve process on the 
defendant.  Their suits included allegations that the defendants, acting 
under color of law, engaged in tortious violations of international law.  
These cases involved violations of a subset of enumerated human rights 
so grave as to be indisputably prohibited by international law, including 
kidnapping, torture, homicide, and violations of the laws of war.23  The 
courts in these cases applied international law against state actors or 
 16. Id. at 879. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2005). 
 19. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 879.  See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d. Cir. 1995). 
 20. Three cases involved the ATCA prior to Filártiga. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. 
Md. 1961); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 1 Bee 
74 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).  See also Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner 
at 17, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 03–399 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2004). 
 21. The ATCA is central to this debate particularly as it pertains to accountability for human 
rights and humanitarian law violations.  There are other statutes cited in this debate, including the 
aspects of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and federal antitrust statutes. 
 22. 70 F.3d 232. 
 23. See id.; Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876. 
2005] COSMOPOLITANISM AND CIL  111 
 
defendants acting under color of state law.24  Nonetheless, the opinions 
published in these cases set the groundwork for future cases to be 
litigated against private actors. 
The Karadzic case is probably best conceptualized as a transition 
between cases against public actors, or individuals acting under color of 
state law, and those involving private actors as defendants.  Among the 
questions in Karadzic was whether Radovan Karadzic was a state 
actor.25  He was the leader of the Bosnian-Serb faction when he 
perpetrated the violations at issue, but this meant he was the leader of an 
unrecognized government.26  According to the district court, he was a 
private actor and, therefore, he could not be held liable for violations of 
human rights.27  The appellate court reversed, finding two separate 
circumstances under which a private actor could bear international 
obligations.  The first was when the individual commits one of a narrow 
set of wrongs that are of such gravity that state action is not considered a 
requisite for responsibility—for example, genocide.  The second was 
when the violations were sufficiently tied to state action as to bring 
international standards to bear.  Still, in Karadzic’s case, the court found 
that the significant support he received from the Yugoslav government 
gave his conduct the color of law.28  During the era in which ATCA 
cases were limited to this type of litigation—when ATCA cases featured 
only state actors alleged to have committed violations of the most 
indisputably protected human rights—there was little opposition to the 
statute.  At that time, the State Department of the United States issued 
advisory letters to the courts hearing these cases that encouraged them 
not only to hear the cases, but also to feel at liberty to find the 
defendants guilty for whatever violations they had committed.29
 24. The Second Circuit’s decision in Kadic addresses this issue directly.  Radovan Karadzic was 
the leader of the self-proclaimed Serb-Bosnian republic, “Srpska.”  Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236.  The court 
discussed in dicta that the application of certain aspects of international law need not be limited to states 
or state actors but preferred to characterize Karadzic as a state actor rather than as a private individual 
because he was acting under color of law because of his collaboration with the former Yugoslavia or 
with substantial Yugoslavian aid.  But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775–76 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (stating that the application of international law is limited in 
this way:  “[s]pecifically, I do not believe the law of nations imposes the same responsibility or liability 
on non-state actors, such as the PLO, as it does on states and persons acting under color of state law.”).
 25. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala, (2d Cir. 
1980), reprinted in 19 INT’L LEG. MATS. 585 (1980).  Statement of Interest of the United States, Kadic 
v. Karadzic, No. 94–9035 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming the ATCA and the Filàrtiga litigation), cited in 
Statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith, Professor of International Law, 
Yale Law School, before the House Committee on International Relations on “A Survey and Analysis of 
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Still, the recognition in Karadzic that private actors could bear 
responsibility for human rights violations under the ATCA led to the 
development of claims against private actors, including corporate actors, 
for violations of international law—primarily the CIL of human rights.  
Well-known examples include a case brought against Royal Dutch/Shell 
Oil charging the defendants with complicity in human rights violations 
in Nigeria, including the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others who were 
protesting a pipeline the company was laying;30 the Aguinda v. Texaco, 
Inc. litigation, in which indigenous people in Ecuador brought an action 
against Texaco alleging multiple violations of rights recognized by 
international human rights treaties;31 and a case initiated by Burmese 
peasants alleging that Unocal Corporation was complicit in the violation 
of various human rights, including forced relocation, torture, rape, and 
murder, which were committed by the Burmese military while providing 
security for the construction of a Unocal pipeline.32
The ATCA portion of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain33 featured a different 
kind of private actor as its defendant.  Humberto Alvarez-Machain, the 
original plaintiff in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, was a Mexican national 
who was kidnapped in Mexico by other Mexican citizens acting on 
behalf of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).  He was 
thereafter transported to the United States where he was arrested, 
imprisoned, tried, and acquitted of any involvement in the murder of a 
DEA agent.  After returning to his home country, he sued the Mexican 
citizens who kidnapped him, including Francisco Sosa, for contracting 
for his abduction.34
At the end of June 2004, the Supreme Court found that Alvarez-
Machain was not entitled to recover damages from Sosa under the 
ATCA.35  Still, the decision did not close the door on ATCA claims, as 
many had feared it might.  Instead, the Court’s opinion was a directive 
to the lower federal courts regarding the types of claims they should 
recognize under the ATCA.36
Another significant ATCA occurrence came in November 2004 when 
Judge Sprizzo of the United States District Court for the Southern 
Supporting Human Rights and Democracy 2002–03” July 9, 2003 at nn. 15, 16. 
 30. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002). 
 31. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d. Cir. 2002). 
 32. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 33. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700 (2004).  See also infra Part III. 
 34. Id. at 697–99. 
 35. Id. at 692–93. 
 36. See infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (discussing criteria lower courts are to apply). 
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District of New York used the tools laid out in Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Sosa in order to dismiss a set of South Africa apartheid 
cases, including those against corporations that failed to divest from 
South Africa during the apartheid era.37
In December 2004, Unocal and the Burmese peasants mentioned 
earlier settled out of court, ending a long litigation battle over Unocal’s 
alleged complicity in human rights violations committed by the Burmese 
government.  Although the terms of the settlement are confidential, in 
principle it “will compensate plaintiffs and provide funds enabling 
plaintiffs and their representatives to improve living conditions, 
healthcare and education, and protect the rights of people from the 
pipeline region.”38  Although there has been some debate over the 
meaning of this settlement, commentators have generally agreed that 
Unocal was trying to avoid a publicized court decision finding them 
liable under the ATCA.39
III.  CIL AND THE SOSA DECISION 
This Part will focus on the Court’s treatment of CIL and the directive 
the Court’s opinion gave to the lower federal courts as to the treatment 
of future ATCA claims.  Among the questions the Court tried to answer 
were how to translate the norms originally contemplated by this 200-
year-old statute into a modern day formulation.  Or, rather, how to apply 
the law of nations, limited at that time to prohibitions on violations of 
safe conduct, the protection of ambassadors, and the outlawing of 
piracy, to a world in which human rights are increasingly taking on the 
character of CIL. 
Nearly twenty years ago, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States (the Restatement) included 
prohibitions against genocide, slavery, extra-judicial killing, 
disappearances, and torture or inhuman treatment in its list of human 
rights that had become CIL.40  But many scholars have argued for a 
broader substantive definition of CIL, such that, if we were to take them 
all seriously, CIL would include essentially all the rights enumerated in 
 37. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 38. American Society of International Law, International Law in Brief, “Unocal to Reach 
Settlement in Alien Tort Claims Act Case” (Dec. 13, 2000), available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/ 
2005/01/ilib050128.htm#b1 (last visited July 15, 2005). 
 39. Unocal Settles Rights Suit in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6. 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 (1987). 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.41
It was in the context of debates over which human rights were 
included in CIL that the Sosa Court attempted to define what was meant 
by the “law of nations” under the ATCA.  The Court decided that “any 
claim based on the present-day law of nations [should] [1] rest on a 
norm of international character, [that is] [2] accepted by the civilized 
world and [3] defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th-century paradigms” that led to the ATCA’s enactment.42
It appears that the first two factors the Court lays out are essentially a 
reformulation of the traditional view of CIL.  The Court anticipated that 
its third criterion would create confusion for future litigants.  At many 
junctures, the opinion urges lower court judges to exercise caution when 
considering claims under the ATCA.  For example, the Court stated that 
“there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a 
federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this 
kind.”43
Still, the Court was not so restrictive in its interpretation of the ATCA 
and the state of play of Erie44 that it shut the door on a court’s derivation 
 41. See, e.g., Dana Zartner Falstrom, Stemming the Flow of Environmental Displacement: 
Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment, 2001 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2001) (“However, I believe the concept of protecting environmentally displaced 
persons can be found in existing treaty law and customary international law.”); Leonard M. Hammer, 
Reconsidering the Israeli Court’s Application of Customary International Law in the Human Rights 
Context, 5 ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 23, 28 (1998) (“While it is difficult to disentangle instances in 
which the courts have referred exclusively to custom as opposed to constitutional principles, the courts 
have referred to the customary international law status of the right to housing, own property, equal 
protection of the law for aliens, and the right against discrimination.”)  One could provide similar 
citations for most if not all rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, 
and the ICESCR. 
Thus as early as 1965 the late Judge Waldock, perhaps a bit prematurely, concluded that 
the Universal Declaration had become, in to, a part of binding, customary international 
law.  Three years later the non-governmental Assembly for Human Rights adopted the 
Montreal Statement, which included the assertion that the “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights . . . has over the years become a part of customary international law.” 
Richard Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. 
INT’L. & COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995–96). 
 42. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
 43. Id. at 725.  Other examples include: “A series of reasons argue for judicial caution when 
considering the kinds of individual claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the early 
statute.”  Id. (describing five reasons for caution). 
 44. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749–50 (describing Erie as “the watershed in which we denied the 
existence of any federal ‘general’ common law”).  Because Erie did away with federal common law, 
some have argued that the judiciary can no longer recognize customary international law apart from 
Congressional authorization.  See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 852–55.  However, 
others have responded that although Erie rejected general federal common law, it still left federal courts 
with jurisdiction to develop law in areas that specifically concern federal—rather than state—issues, 
including international law.  See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Law of our Land:  Customary International 
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of substantive CIL norms.  Instead, the Court adopted the view that “the 
door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a 
narrow class of international norms today.”45  Rather than enumerate 
which norms currently can meet the standards the Court established, it 
adopted a formulation that accommodates the mutable nature of CIL and 
recognizes that CIL is subject to change—especially in the realm of 
human rights.  In its final formulation, the Sosa opinion employed the 
reasoning and language of Judge Edwards’s concurrence in Tel-Oren46 
and of the Marcos47 litigation in requiring that claims under the ATCA 
rely on international law norms that are 1) definable or specific, 2) 
universal, and 3) obligatory.48  In the final assessment, it appears the 
Court is requiring that claims under the ATCA rely on norms that really 
are CIL, rather than norms that some might argue ought to be CIL. 
This leads us to look again at the Supreme Court’s second factor—
that a claim based on the modern day law of nations must be accepted by 
the civilized world.49  This factor takes us to the heart of the seemingly 
impenetrable problem of determining what really is accepted by the 
civilized world—what CIL really is. 
IV.  IDENTIFYING THE CIL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A.  Finding CIL 
In examining the question of what CIL is, this Article looks to 
standard-bearers, such as Henkin and Slaughter, revisionists, such as 
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Posner, and those arguing for paradigm shifts, 
such as D’Amato and Charney.50  Though this Article does not share 
D’Amato’s or Charney’s views entirely, it does posit that the current 
methods of thinking about CIL are lacking and that it is necessary to 
think about CIL in new ways.  In the face of a litany of changing 
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 433–47 (1997).
 45. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
 46. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) (stating that actions under the ATCA should be limited to “a handful of heinous actions—
each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms”). 
 47. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting 
the position that CIL norms must be “specific, universal, and obligatory” in order to be actionable under 
the ATCA). 
 48. See Section C of the Court’s opinion.  Sosa, 542 U.S. 731–38. 
 49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 50. Anthony D’Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law:  A Plea for 
Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47 (1995–96). 
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conditions brought on by globalization and cosmopolitanization, current 
methods of thinking about CIL formation are outmoded.  Like these 
authors, I also think CIL is due for a paradigm shift. 
This is the project this Article initiates, in an attempt to ultimately 
address at least two recurring problems in CIL that are often dragged 
onto the mat when one is wrestling with CIL.  The first is the democratic 
participation problem; the second is the action-versus-words dilemma 
inherent in determinations of what ought to serve as evidence of CIL.  
Though this Article will only address the first of these issues, it will lay 
the groundwork for a later discussion of the action-versus-words 
problem.  In order to address either of these problems, though, it is 
necessary to first explain my core proposal. 
Many believe it is difficult to determine the content of CIL because 
there may be too many sources to which one must look in determining 
whether or not a particular norm has attained the status of custom.51  
The idea is that there are too many statements from too many countries 
and renowned jurists as to what human rights states observe out of a 
sense of obligation to allow for an accurate accounting of the current 
content of CIL. 
Perhaps this is incorrect and, instead, one of the reasons it is so 
difficult to determine the content of CIL is that there are too few sources 
rather than too many currently being taken into account.  It is plausible 
that the sources of data to which one looks in trying to determine which 
norms are CIL are overly limited or at least that they are not derived 
from all the necessary locations. 
The current CIL formation process formally looks only to the actions 
and words of states.  What is missing in the current system of CIL is a 
recognition that individuals ought to be active participants in the CIL 
formation process; that individuals ought to be consulted regarding the 
content of CIL.  McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen have given cursory 
attention to this possibility.  They state that the words and actions that 
make up evidence of CIL “may include the acts and utterances not only 
of officials (transnational and national) . . . but even of private 
individuals and representatives of nongovernmental organizations.”52
This could be accomplished through a proliferation of venues such as 
the International Court of Justice,53 courts entertaining claims based on 
 51. See, e.g., id. 
 52. MYERS S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:  THE BASIC 
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 269 (1980). 
 53. See Vincent Chetail, The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International 
Humanitarian Law, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS No. 850, 235, 238 (2003) (“Contemporary 
international humanitarian law is composed of: (A) a complex set of conventional rules, (B) customary 
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universal jurisdiction statutes, or provisional courts such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,54 where individuals can 
and do advance claims undergirded by assertions of particular human 
rights norms as CIL.  These venues, together with empirical 
documentation of which norms individuals invoke as CIL, would allow 
us to learn and better understand what individuals truly believe have 
come to be their rights under international law and, more specifically, 
under CIL.  Since individuals are the subjects of the CIL of human 
rights, it must be that information regarding their perceptions of their 
rights under CIL would be helpful. 
B.  The CIL of Human Rights 
During the 1990s, international law scholars began to recognize that 
human rights norms that had taken on the character of customary 
international law had emerged as a particular category of CIL distinct 
from the wider body of CIL.55  Several characteristics make the CIL of 
human rights different from traditional CIL, including a departure from 
the “approach that looks [exclusively] ‘into the past to identify 
customary patterns of State practice’ and then turns ‘this empirical result 
into a normative projection for the future.’”56  The new CIL of human 
rights also requires cognizance of the sometimes rapidly evolving opinio 
juris component of CIL, such that a mutable view of CIL can be taken, 
which can accommodate new and additional human rights norms. 
The relative changeability of the CIL of human rights is distinct from 
traditional conceptions of CIL, and thus it has received a wide degree of 
criticism and proposals for new ways of thinking and talking about it, as 
well as proposals that we create new categories of international law to 
norms and (C) jus cogens, which the case law of the International Court of Justice helps to clarify and 
interpret.”). 
 54. This is suggested in the Tadic case, where the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia held that CIL imposes criminal liability for serious violations of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Judgment of 2nd Oct. 1995, para. 137, 35 I.L.M. 32 
(1996). 
 55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 (1987) (devoting a section on customary 
international law to the sub-category of the CIL of human rights).  See also Bruno Simma & Philip 
Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:  Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1992).  A 1994 symposium hosted by the Georgia Journal of International & 
Comparative Law devoted to the issue of the CIL of human rights.  Richard Lillich’s contribution to that 
symposium is a good example of the focused attention the sub-category of CIL of human rights received 
as it emerged in the discourse among international law scholars.  See Lillich, supra note 41, at 10. 
 56. Lillich, supra note 41, at 12–13 (quoting Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 89). 
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accommodate the necessary potential for the CIL of human rights to 
change rapidly.  For example, Louis Henkin has proposed a new source 
of international law, termed “non-conventional law,”57 which he sees as 
being less dependent on custom and more based on “contemporary 
human values” which make up a fundamental or quasi-constitutional 
law.58
Similarly, the late Jonathan Charney acknowledged the lamentably 
slow traditional development of CIL and argued that the rise of global 
problems has necessitated the development of an international law that 
does not require sweeping international consensus in order to gain 
authority.  He argued that the traditional processes of developing CIL 
may have suited an era in which sovereignty was the foremost principle, 
but the increase in the number of diverse states, coupled with the 
decreasing ability of domestic legal systems to maintain isolation from 
the international sphere, require a change in the way international law 
and norms are developed.59  He joined those who argued that the 
aftermath of World War II reflected a new willingness to bind states to 
international norms, regardless of an individual state’s acceptance of 
those norms.60
Rather than attempting to argue that CIL be changed to accommodate 
this shift in international lawmaking, Charney proposed what he called 
“universal” or “general” international law, which avoids the problem of 
attempting to develop a CIL of human rights within the traditional CIL 
formation process.  Charney made clear that his proposal is not 
revolutionary.  Rather, it reflects the current practice of multilateral 
forums that, through their everyday operations, accelerate the 
development of international law.61
Others have rejected proposals by authors such as Henkin and 
Charney for the creation of new categories of international law and have 
maintained that the two principal sources of international law are, and 
should remain, treaty and custom.62  That being the case, any provision 
of international law that does not derive its status as such from treaty 
must necessarily derive its status from CIL.  For those who maintain this 
traditional formulation of international law, it has become important to 
 57. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 37 
(1995–96). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 543–44 (1993). 
 60. Id. at 550. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International 
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997). 
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name the rapidly evolving human rights sub-category of international 
customary law.63  This category has often been called the CIL of human 
rights64 and this Article will adopt this terminology.65
C.  The CIL of Human Rights and the Individual 
For much of its history, international law was concerned with 
relations among autonomous states.  States were seen as both its creators 
and its subjects, under the traditional assumptions that international law 
is based on an interstate system in which each state is sovereign.66  
Historically, this was an accurate conception of international law, as its 
primary concerns “until well into this century were diplomatic relations, 
war, treaties and the law of the sea.”67
In the wake of World War II, a fundamental change occurred in the 
field of international law as a result of the emergence of international 
human rights law.  This development shifted the focus of international 
law so that state values and concerns were no longer the exclusive issues 
addressed by international law.68
In traditional international law the individual played an inconspicuous 
part because the international interests of the individual and his contacts 
across the frontier were rudimentary.  This is no longer the case.69
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant 
of Economic Social and Cultural Rights, as well as all subsequent 
human rights treaties, have clearly placed a distinct focus on the 
individual and on human, rather than state, interests.  These treaties were 
developed to protect individuals from each other and, importantly, from 
the actions of states.  As a result of this “acknowledgement of the worth 
 63. See id.  For some it has become important to identify this sub-category in an effort to simply 
understand the changing nature of CIL. For others, it has been in an effort to assert the importance of 
maintaining the traditional CIL formation process in order to argue for a narrow definition of the content 
of CIL such that new and developing human rights norms are not easily included. 
 64. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 62, at 319. 
 65. Though the current author is adopting the term “CIL of human rights,” she refrains from 
taking a position at this time as to the approaches of Henkin, Charney, and others who have argued for a 
new source or category of international law.  While it may be that the articulation and development of 
such new categories is necessary, defining a position on this is outside the scope of this Article. 
 66. LOUIS C. HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 2–3 (4th ed. 2001). 
 67. Charney, supra note 59, at 529. 
 68. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 66, at 3. 
 69. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (1950), reprinted in 
HENRY STEINER & PHILLIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:  LAW, POLITICS, 
MORALS 147 (2d ed. 2000). 
120 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
of the human personality as the ultimate unit of all law,”70 there has 
been an attendant “recognition of the individual as a subject of 
international rights.”71  No longer are states the exclusive subjects, nor 
are individuals merely objects, of international law. 
At the same time, individuals have taken an active and participatory 
role in the development of human rights treaties.  Experts who are 
currently assigned the task of drafting new human rights treaties or 
norms have become sophisticated in their approach to ensuring that the 
documents will be relevant and effective in addressing pertinent themes.  
For example, in the context of this symposium, Professor Weissbrodt 
has explained the conscientious process by which he and his team 
consulted with essential individuals and relevant organizations as part of 
the process of drafting the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights.72
The rationale for this consultation includes a belief that if human 
rights norms are meant to protect individuals, it is necessary to know 
what protections individuals actually need.  Without such consultation, 
any new norms or treaties might miss an opportunity to be most 
effective.  In this way, human rights treaties have also changed the 
traditional conceptions of international law.  Just as states are no longer 
the only subjects of international law, nor are they any longer in 
exclusive control of the international law formation process. 
While the development of international human rights law has resulted 
in individuals becoming generally recognized as subjects of treaty law, 
just as they have become active participants in human rights treaty 
formation, there has been little formal change in the traditional thinking 
about how CIL is formed.  Traditional thinking about the process by 
which CIL is formed is among the last great stands of the exclusive 
sovereignty of states in international law.  Here, and in few other places, 
it “is the sovereign State, with its claim to exclusive allegiance and its 
pretensions to exclusive usefulness that interposes itself as an 
impenetrable barrier between the individual and the greater society of all 
humanity.”73
Like human rights treaty law, the CIL of human rights aims to protect 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Human Rights Principles and Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/XX, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1 (February 
2002 for discussion in July/August 2002); see also David Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74 
U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 68–71 (2005). 
 73. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at 61. 
2005] COSMOPOLITANISM AND CIL  121 
 
individuals, making individuals the subject of that law.  Yet, with few 
exceptions, individuals have only very indirect mechanisms for 
participation in the formation of the CIL of human rights through their 
governments’ words and occasionally conflicting actions.  But it need 
not be this way.  What individuals do and what they believe about which 
human rights currently are or ought to be afforded and protected in the 
civilized world should be a factor in any determination of whether a 
norm is accepted by the civilized world, thus making it part of the CIL 
of human rights.74
This is an underdeveloped idea.  However, there is some evidence 
that others have considered the possibility that individuals ought to be 
consulted in the CIL formation process.  Consider for example: 
the liberal notion that private transnational behavior serves a quasi-public 
purpose in creating the web of economic interdependence between 
nations.  Perhaps it follows from liberal international theory that the CIL 
process should take into account the practice of private persons and 
enterprises as well as the practice of States.  Such a notion is even more 
radical than the idea that the State practice of democracies should count 
more than that of dictatorships or any other types of non-liberal States.75
While this idea may seem radical on first impression, the central 
assertion of this Article is that not only ought individuals be consulted 
when looking for evidence of CIL of human rights but that, in practice, 
they already are.  Jordan Paust has articulated that “the reality of 
individual participation is another important feature of customary human 
rights law that is too often ignored or viewed less than 
comprehensively.”76  Paust is among the few scholars who have 
attempted to articulate the role of the individual in the formation of the 
CIL of human rights.77  He states: 
Individual participation in the creation and shaping of customary human 
rights is less well-perceived, but no less real.  All human beings 
recognizably participate in a dynamic process of acceptance or 
expectation which leads to patterns of opinio juris measurable at various 
 74. Whether a norm is accepted by the civilized world is one of the criteria the Sosa decision 
established for future determinations of whether a claim brought under the ATCA is legitimate.  See 
supra note 42 and the accompanying text. 
 75. David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of 
Customary International Law, 39 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 198, 241 (1996).
 76. Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 
25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 147, 155 (1995–96). 
 77. See id. at 155–58, 162; Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources 
and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 69–73 (1990); see also Jordan J. Paust, 
The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal Process, 25 MICH. J. 
INT’L. L. 1229, 1245 (2004). 
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moments.78 . . .  Since each nation-state, indeed each human being, is a 
participant in both the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of dynamic 
customary human rights law, each may initiate a change in such law, or, 
with others, reaffirm its validity.79
Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen have also considered the 
role of the individual in international law and specifically the importance 
of the individual in shaping the norms that come to make up the CIL of 
human rights.  They view the world as a meshing of small and large, 
powerful and less powerful communities that are in constant contact 
with each other such that they and their values intermingle and 
interpenetrate.  In this “comprehensive social process” individuals are 
constantly “engaged in the shaping and sharing of values.”  These 
values, in turn, become “the human rights which the larger community 
of humankind protects or fails to protect.”80
Lung-chu Chen has taken a particularly critical view of what he calls 
the “Vattelian fiction,” which he describes as being contained in 
Emmeric de Vattel’s position that an injury to an individual was an 
injury to that person’s state.  Under this conception of individual rights 
under international law, if the rights of a citizen of a given state are 
violated, only that state is permitted to carry the claims of the violated 
individual to the international plane.81
Chen goes on to explain, however, that the contemporary human 
rights movement has demanded a number of changes in the traditional 
methods of thinking about international law.  For example, he points to 
the global concern for human welfare, such that human rights are “no 
longer matters of domestic jurisdiction” but have become matters of 
international concern.82  As a result, international law has expanded its 
scope such that it now protects all human beings, not only from abuse by 
foreign governments, but also from abuses committed by their own 
governments.83  “Indeed,” Chen states, “a state centered international 
law is being transformed into an international law of homocentricity.”84
These authors have considered the possibility and reality of 
consulting the actions of individuals as evidence of the CIL of human 
 78. Paust, supra note 76, at 155 (citing LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 76–81 (1989); MCDOUGAL 
ET AL., supra note 52, at 73–74, 80 n.208, 81, 86, 88–89, 96–107, 167–68, 173–79, 207–16, 269, 413, 
416, 471; Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 77, at 69–73). 
 79. Paust, supra note 76, at 156–57. 
 80. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 94. 
 81. CHEN, supra note 78, at 77. 
 82. Id. at 78. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 79. 
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rights.  Though Paust asserts that individual expectations can take part in 
the formation of opinio juris, neither Paust nor others articulate how 
individuals might express such expectations such that they take on the 
weight of evidence of CIL.  McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen come close 
to doing so but in order to do this, they first must redefine “custom.”  
The following extract demonstrates their effort to accentuate the 
individual over the nation-state: 
Through the concept of “custom,” that is, of law created by uniformities 
of people’s behavior and other communications, individuals and their 
private associations have always participated in the prescribing 
function.85
It is not clear whether the “custom” to which they refer is customary 
international law or whether it is some other sort of less-recognized 
custom.  However, they go on to state that individuals have the ability to 
“invoke the authoritative application of transnational prescription” 
though their use of and appearance before national and international 
courts and tribunals.86
Even if one concludes, as this Article does, that the “custom” to 
which McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen refer is, or at least contributes to, 
CIL, what they seem to miss is the possibility that individuals exercising 
the invocation function—or appearing in courts and tribunals—has an 
effect on the formation of CIL. 
National courts and the international courts and tribunals referred to 
by McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, as well as mechanisms like the 
ATCA, provide avenues through which individuals might have direct 
participation in the CIL formation process.  In submitting ATCA claims 
before a U.S. federal court, for example, individual plaintiffs formally 
express their expectations regarding the human rights protections to 
which they believe they are entitled. 
When individuals are harmed and recognize that harm as wrongful, 
they may engage the legal system to seek redress.  If they do so through 
a suit that claims a violation of their human rights under international 
law, they leave a pool of evidence about their beliefs regarding the 
protections international law actually affords or ought to afford them. 
Such legal actions may rest on claims of violations of treaty law, 
customary law, or both.  Most party briefs in such litigation will clearly 
indicate claims as treaty-based or CIL-based.  Still, it may, at times, be 
difficult to discern to what extent the rights claimed are rights based on 
treaty law or customary law and may muddy the aid some legal actions 
 85. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 177. 
 86. Id. 
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can bring to the question of what individuals believe their human rights 
are, as a matter of CIL. 
Litigation under the ATCA is an exceptionally pure venue for this 
type of evidence pooling.  Claims under the Act must be founded on 
violations of “the law of nations,” or CIL.  The statute reads in its 
entirety:  “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”87  However, the United States 
has failed to accept any provision in any human rights treaty giving 
individuals the right to initiate private actions under such treaties.  As a 
result, the ATCA has been limited to application in cases where the 
plaintiffs can point to CIL as the basis for their claims. 
In all cases where claims are based on human rights violations, 
litigation under the ATCA is thus an excellent source of evidence of the 
beliefs of individuals as to the CIL of human rights.  Through their 
ATCA suits, plaintiffs enter into discussions with the particular judges 
or panels of judges hearing their claims about what the CIL of human 
rights is and what it ought to be.  In so doing, they also provide valuable 
information to nation-state representatives, the judiciaries of other 
nations, and to multinational bodies about which norms civilized people 
believe form the CIL of human rights. 
This Article has already discussed the changeable character of the 
CIL of human rights.  Given that this is the case, evidence seen through 
observing litigation under the ATCA is highly valuable in forming 
accounts of what individuals believe composes the CIL of human rights.  
This litigation can indicate what the individuals who make up the 
civilized world believe are their rights as citizens therein. 
In liberal democratic societies, the beliefs and opinions of individuals 
as to what rights are and ought to be are important in their actual 
formation or mutation over time.  Alexander Bickel has addressed this 
phenomenon in the domestic constitutional context: 
The preliminary suggestions may be advanced that the rule of principle 
imposed by the Court is seldom rigid, that the Court has ways of 
persuading before it attempts to coerce, and that, over time, sustained 
opinion running counter to the Court’s constitutional law can achieve its 
nullification, directly or by desuetude.  It may further be that if the 
process is properly carried out, an aspect of the current—not only the 
timeless, mystic—popular will finds expression in constitutional 
adjudication.  The result may be a tolerable accommodation with the 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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theory and practice of democracy.88
Like American constitutional law, the CIL of human rights is 
changeable.  Thus, maintaining official venues for individuals to 
formally express their beliefs as to their rights is necessary to ensure that 
the CIL of human rights remains vibrant and relevant to ever-changing 
social, economic, and political conditions. 
D.  Obstacles to Individual Participation in Forming 
the CIL of Human Rights 
1.  Revisionist Views of CIL 
Those versed in CIL literature may at this point be thinking about the 
concerns voiced by Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, Posner, Trimble, and 
others that allowing our judiciary to interpret CIL is undemocratic.  
Professor Trimble, for example, has argued that CIL is illegitimate 
because, inter alia, it is incompatible with the American political 
tradition.89  Professor Trimble explains that U.S. judges must base their 
opinions on accepted reasons, such as the violation of constitutional 
rights.  Courts cannot base their decisions on whether “the judge saw 
three crows cross the full moon the night before the decision;”90  such an 
opinion would not be accepted by the American people.  CIL, he argues, 
is analogous to a judge basing his decision upon the story of the crows, 
rather than upon accepted legal precedents. 
Professor Trimble reaches this conclusion by arguing that the 
American political tradition is rooted in a limited government that is 
responsive to its constituencies.  However, he argues that because CIL is 
created by foreign governments that “are neither representative of the 
American political community nor responsive to it,”91 CIL cannot be 
reconciled with American political philosophy.  This view seemingly 
fails to see the potential for, and the reality of, American participation in 
the CIL formation process. 
American political organs do participate in the CIL formation process.  
Some have argued persuasively that, in fact, the United States has an 
overly influential role in the CIL formation process due to its power and 
 88. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 28 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 89. Trimble, supra note 14 at 716–23. 
 90. Id. at 718. 
 91. Id. at 721. 
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persuasiveness.  A recent essay by Michael Byers is useful in developing 
an understanding of the influence of power on the formation of CIL.92  
In it, he cites the work of Charles de Visscher, who observed in 1953: 
international custom has been compared to the gradual formation of a 
road across vacant land. . . .  Among the users are always some who mark 
the soil more deeply with their footprints than others, either because of 
their weight, which is to say their power in this world, or because their 
interests bring them more frequently this way.93
The activity of helping a court determine the law is a democratic 
process in which the judiciary and the bar have been involved since the 
inception of the American legal system.  The Memorandum for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae in Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala illustrates this 
point.94  The memorandum does not specifically argue that courts are 
acting consistently with the American political tradition in helping to 
define CIL.  But the memorandum essentially accomplishes this task by 
presenting reasoned legal analysis, encouraging the Second Circuit to 
adopt the position that torture violates the law of nations.95
Determining the law is a judicial process as old as the judiciary itself.  
Rather than being inconsistent with the American political tradition, 
defining the contours of CIL is a function that U.S. courts have been 
engaged in for quite some time, and it is a process that is suitable for the 
judicial branch to undertake. 
The concern expressed by CIL revisionist scholars is that the 
application of CIL by U.S. courts is undemocratic because CIL has not 
been formed through the American democratic process and is not part of 
our federal common law.  Their concern is for the American democratic 
process, and this Article does not intend to diminish that concern.96  But 
for all the consternation about the American democratic process, their 
concern fails to see the forest for the trees.  It fails to see the broader 
potential for democratic participation in the formation of the CIL of 
human rights.  The remainder of this Article will argue that it is 
 92. See Michael Byers, Introduction Power, Obligation, and Customary International Law, 11 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 81, 84–85 (2001). 
 93. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (Percy 
Corbett trans., 1957), reprinted in Michael Byers, Introduction Power Obligation and Customary 
International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 81, 84 (2001).  Professor Byers also points to the work 
of Michael Reisman, Oscar Schachter, and Surge Sur in establishing the idea that powerful states 
influence the CIL formation process more than less powerful states. 
 94. Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980). 
 95. Id. 
 96. A proper investigation of the American constitutional arguments surrounding the ATCA is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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appropriate to consider and realize this broader potential because of a 
fundamental shift in society and a fundamental shift in our conception of 
ourselves. 
2.  Traditional Notions of Sovereignty 
The greatest difficulty concerning individual participation in the 
constitutive process of CIL has historically been the exclusive focus on 
the role of the nation state.  This view has traditionally resulted in great 
reluctance to see the role that the individual can and may play in the 
formation of CIL.  While this view may have been well adapted to the 
international legal order before the end of World War II when 
individuals had minimal participation in international law as either 
subjects or objects thereof, the establishment of the human rights 
movement, which aims to protect individuals and which requires their 
participation to previously unknown extents, has made the exclusive 
focus on the sovereignty of nation-states simply outmoded. 
The international legal order now recognizes that the nation-state can 
be both a protector and a violator of human rights.  This is the reason 
human rights treaties protect individuals from state and state-sponsored 
abuses.  The potential power of international human rights law to protect 
individuals from their own states is a well-settled example of a re-
orientation of the concept of national sovereignty such that less power is 
being vested in the state and more in the individual.  Nonetheless, 
individuals are not seen as participatory actors in the formation of the 
CIL of human rights, despite the likelihood of violations of the CIL of 
human rights being perpetrated by states.97
V.  COSMOPOLITAN IDENTITIES 
A rethinking of CIL begins with a rethinking of who should be 
empowered in the CIL formation process.  Ironically, though perhaps 
logically, this rethinking starts with Immanuel Kant, a contemporary of 
 97. This failure to recognize individuals as participants in the CIL formation process creates 
some riddles that have long puzzled scholars on CIL.  Take, for example, state A, which has signed 
treaties and made declarations regarding a protection against capital punishment.  Regardless, State A 
continues to implement the death penalty.  When assessing whether there has emerged a right to be 
protected from capital punishment, should one look to the treaties and statements of State A as evidence 
of emerging custom or should they look to State A’s engagement in capital punishment as evidence that 
State A does not subscribe to a protection against capital punishment as a matter of CIL.  This is known 
as the action-versus-words problem and is, as yet, unresolved.  It is possible that an emphasis on the 
individual may help to alleviate this problem, though a detailed exploration of this question must be 
reserved for another day. 
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the first American Congress, which drafted the ATCA.  Kant wrote in 
one of his many essays on peace and cosmopolitanism: 
The peoples of the earth have entered in varying degree into a universal 
community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights 
in one part of the world is felt everywhere.  The idea of a cosmopolitan 
right is not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the 
unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a 
universal right of humanity.98
Although the notion of a “universal community” is not novel, the idea 
is more a reality today than at any time in the past.99  The end of the 
Cold War, the emergence of global financial markets, and the explosion 
of global mass media have all contributed to the increased 
interconnectedness of the earth’s peoples.  The globalization 
phenomenon has generated an astonishing amount of scholarship.  A 
wide variety of disciplinary treatments has resulted in different 
approaches, interpretations, and appraisals of globalization. 
The lack of any universally accepted consensus or narrative on 
globalization should not be seen as evidence that the phenomenon does 
not exist.  Rather, scholars utilizing a variety of approaches have 
highlighted strikingly similar developments that indicate the reality of 
the formation of an increasingly global interconnectedness.  The tug 
between local and global, and between homogeneity and heterogeneity, 
is a manifestation and symptom of this increasing interconnectedness. 
This Article adopts the work of Benedict Anderson and his 
subsequent adaptation and interpretation by other scholars like Manuel 
Castells, who argue that the rise of the global economy and mass 
media—the two being inextricably linked—has created a nascent global 
community.100
Benedict Anderson’s essential argument in Imagined Communities is 
that the development of print capitalism provided the foundation for the 
development of national consciousness by creating a common, 
standardized language that allowed previously disconnected people to 
“imagine” themselves as part of a larger community, despite the fact that 
 98. IMMANUEL KANT, KANT:  POLITICAL WRITINGS 107–08 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans., 
2d ed. 1991), quoted in David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils, 12 
PUBLIC CULTURE 2, 529, 532 (2000). 
 99. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS:  POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 
327. 
 100. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991).  Anderson’s central argument is that the development of print 
capitalism provided the foundation for the development of national consciousness by creating a 
common, standardized language that allowed previously disconnected people to “imagine” themselves 
as part of a larger community, despite the fact that these people never actually met. 
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these people never actually met.  The development of national 
consciousness in Europe provides an illustrative case study in this 
process.  Anderson demonstrates that, prior to the invention of the 
printing press, Latin was the overwhelmingly dominant language of 
educated Europe.  Few books were printed in vernacular languages.  
Latin owed its dominance in large part to the dominance of the Catholic 
Church, and the two were inextricably linked.  The development of the 
printing press, coupled with the “logic of capitalism,” led to an ever-
increasing search for markets.  Once the Latin-reading market had been 
saturated, printers began to expand into vernacular languages in order to 
expand their market.  This undermined the sacral position of Latin as the 
dominant language and undermined the Catholic Church’s vise-grip on 
the communication of ideas.101
Having demonstrated the disruptive effect that print capitalism had on 
the status quo, Anderson moves to his argument about the power of the 
print languages to unite.  He argues that print language united in three 
ways:  (1) by creating a unified means of communication that would 
have been impossible in even spoken vernaculars (because of the huge 
varieties of English, Spanish, etc.), and thus fostering an awareness of 
other people in that “particular language-field, and at the same time that 
only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, belonged;”102 (2) by 
giving “a new fixity to language which . . . helped to build that image of 
antiquity that was so central to the subjective idea of the nation;” and (3) 
by creating “languages-of-power” that essentially eliminated or 
assimilated certain variations while elevating those closest to the print 
language.103
Eventually, the print vernacular became adopted by the developing 
state bureaucracies as the language of business, and the rising 
bureaucracies were filled by the growing middle class, which was 
necessarily versed in the new vernacular.  “The general growth in 
literacy, commerce, industry, communications and state machinery . . . 
created powerful new impulses for vernacular linguistic unification.”104  
This linguistic unification allowed physically disconnected people 
across large distances to imagine themselves as part of a community 
 101. This is the foundation of Anderson’s thesis, and it has been somewhat simplified here in 
order to avoid tangentially related arguments about the elimination of “a conception of temporality in 
which cosmology and history were indistinguishable.”  The central point is that the overthrow of a sacral 
language that was inextricably linked with a dominant social hierarchy undermined the seeming 
eternality and antiquity of the status quo, thereby allowing people to begin imagining themselves in new 
ways.  Id. at 36. 
 102. Id. at 44 (italics in original). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 77. 
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based on this shared language.105  As literacy increased, “it became 
easier to arouse popular support, with the masses discovering a new 
glory in the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all 
along.”106
Manuel Castells, through exhaustive empirical and historical research, 
has demonstrated that we are currently in a unique “information 
technology revolution” whose transformative capacity far exceeds that 
of the “industrial revolution.”107  Building on Anderson’s work through 
a utilization of largely empirical economic and demographic data, 
Castells argues that the world is turning into a “network society,” with 
everything and everyone interconnected.  According to Castells: 
What characterizes the development of the informational, global economy 
is precisely its emergence in very different cultural/national contexts: in 
North America, in Western Europe, in Japan, in the “China circle,” in 
Russia, in Latin America, as well as its planetary reach, affecting all 
countries, and leading to a multi-cultural framework of reference.108
To exemplify this interconnectedness, Castells points to the 
“business-led explosive urban growth” of cities such as Bangkok, 
Taipei, and Shanghai, and Western cities such as Madrid, New York, 
and London.  He reminds us that at various moments these cities 
together “went into a slump that triggered a sharp downturn in real estate 
prices and halted new construction.  This urban roller coaster at 
different periods, across areas of the world, illustrates both the 
dependence and vulnerability of any locale, including major cities, to 
changing global flows.”109  This might indicate a sort of business-elite-
driven “cosmopolitanism” rather than a truly global and popular 
phenomenon.  However, Castells convincingly demonstrates that, while 
New York, Shanghai, and Madrid are truly global cities in themselves in 
ways that Omaha, Nebraska, is not, Omaha is linked intimately in the 
“network” through its relation to more “local” Chicago or New York.  
Omaha might not be a global city in the way that New York is, but its 
fate is determined, at least in part, by global economic developments.110  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 80. 
 107. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF NETWORK SOCIETY 39–40 (1996).  Castells points out, 
“The average cost of processing information fell from around $75 per million operations in 1960 to less 
than one-hundredth of a cent in 1990.”  Id. at 45.  This remarkable development of information 
technology was used to further accelerate the process of technological innovation.  This helps account 
for the pervasiveness and rapidity of technological diffusion and development.  Id. at 29–68. 
 108. Id. at 151. 
 109. Id. at 384 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 378–86.  Castells argues that while the megacities like New York, London, and 
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This realization has important consequences, because, as Castells points 
out, the increasing interconnectedness and interrelation of the global 
economy has seriously damaging effects on those who are excluded.  
Those outside of the global network are profoundly affected by it 
because of their exclusion.111
Mass media accompanied and helped to create this global network.  
Castells argues that the transformative impact of the multimedia world is 
unique because of the ease of access and interaction for individuals, and 
the extreme difficulty of any power structure (nation or otherwise) to 
censor or control the flow of information.112  Furthermore, the global 
mass media allows “cultural products . . . to circulate on every continent.  
No state is disconnected completely from global telecommunications 
networks.”113  This interconnectedness has resulted in the rise of 
“deterritorialization,” where culture, formerly tied to the local or 
regional level, exists instead in the abstract.114
Professor Arjun Appadurai has compared the role of the mass media 
in the formation of a global identity to the importance of print capitalism 
in the formation of national identity put forth in Benedict Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities.115  The development of this ubiquitous global 
media network has induced “an integration of all messages in a common 
cognitive pattern.”116  Just as the rise of print capitalism provided the 
impetus for breaking down social barriers created by the widespread 
variation of language, the rise of the global media is moving beyond 
language to allow communication and the exchange of ideas in a format 
that can be understood without the written or spoken word.117  Thus, 
“more people than ever before seem to imagine routinely the possibility 
Shanghai are likely to retain their influence as command and control nodes on the network, the network 
is defined by its ability to quickly adapt, thus leading to a great deal of variability depending on shifting 
global conditions. 
 111. Id. at 133; see also ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE 55 (1996) (“Where insulation 
from the larger world seems to have been successful and where the role of the global imagination is 
withheld from ordinary people (in places like Albania, North Korea, and Burma), what seems to appear 
instead is a bizarre state-sponsored realism, which always contains within it the possibility of the 
genocidal and totalizing lunacies of a Pol Pot or of long-repressed desires for critique or exit, as are 
emerging in Albania and Myanmar (Burma).”). 
 112. CASTELLS, supra note 107, at 341, 352. 
 113. HELD ET AL., supra note 99, at 427. 
 114. A.D. Smith, Towards a Global Culture?, in GLOBAL CULTURE:  NATIONALISM, 
GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY 177 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990); see also Jan Aart Scholte, What 
is ‘Global’ about Globalization?, in HELD ET AL., supra note 99, at 84. 
 115. APPADURAI, supra note 111, at 8. 
 116. CASTELLS, supra note 107, at 371 (emphasis in original). 
 117. See id. at 371; see also APPADURAI, supra note 111, at 194; ULF HANNERZ, TRANSNATIONAL 
CONNECTIONS:  CULTURE, PEOPLE, PLACES 21 (1996). 
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that they or their children will live and work in places other than where 
they were born.”118  In addition, and more importantly for the purposes 
of this Article, Appadurai asserts that the reach of mass media allows 
previously unconnected peoples to begin to “imagine and feel things 
together.”119  This ability to experience, believe, imagine, or feel things 
together has led to the rise of international organization of peoples 
across political boundaries in order to pursue common political, 
economic, or ideological goals.120
Akira Iriye has found that the marked increase in the number of 
international organizations suggests the development of a global 
community that identifies itself, at least in part, by connections and 
concerns that stretch across local and national boundaries.121  According 
to Iriye: 
For both intergovernmental organizations and international non-
governmental organizations to emerge, nations and peoples had to be 
strongly aware that they shared certain interests and objectives across . . . 
national boundaries and that they could best solve their many problems 
by pooling their resources and effecting transnational cooperation.122
Iriye traces this development to the late nineteenth century, but 
clearly indicates that the movement has gained momentum in recent 
decades.  For example, the number of intergovernmental organizations 
grew from 280 to 1,530 between 1972 and 1984, while the number of 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increased from 
2,795 to 12,686 during the same period.123  Thus, the increasingly 
international organization of peoples across political boundaries in order 
to pursue common political, economic, or ideological goals evidences 
the development of an increasingly imagined global community.124
Globalization has produced a transnational public sphere that can 
 118. APPADURAI, supra note 111, at 6. 
 119. Id. at 8. 
 120. See Martin Kohler, From the National to the Cosmopolitan Public Sphere, in RE-IMAGINING 
POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 231 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 
1998).  Many authors have articulated this phenomenon.  See, e.g., APPADURAI, supra note 111, at 167–
68. 
 121. AKIRA IRIYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 8 (2002). 
 122. Id. at 9. 
 123. Id. at 129.  Iriye points out that the numbers are even more staggering if one includes the 
number of local offices rather than just headquarters (7,073 intergovernmental organizations and 79,786 
international NGOs). 
 124. See Kohler, supra note 120, at 231.  Surely, the exponential growth of multinational 
corporations adds to this interconnectedness across national boundaries.  See also supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
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form the basis for a new global, social, and cultural solidarity.125  
Building on the work of Jürgen Habermas, Craig Calhoun suggests that 
the notion of a global community engaged and linked through the 
rational discussion of common problems, though helpful, produces “thin 
identities” that would be unlikely to provide sufficient cohesive force for 
its members in times of crises.126
Calhoun goes on to suggest, however, that in order to build a lasting 
solidarity, the global community must move beyond the mere 
recognition of overlapping interests and begin to engage in “shared 
projects of imagining a better future.”127  He argues that the thin veneer 
of unity provided by a shared economic program can do little to 
substitute for shared notions of global humanity produced by “cultural 
creativity” and “mutual engagement.”128
Modern economic, political, and technological realities have created a 
globalized community of necessity.  The cultural exchange that has 
accompanied these developments has reduced the centrality of location 
and territory to the formation of identity.  The growing ubiquity of the 
mass media and its transcendence of language through the development 
of integrated audio-visual imagery are helping to produce an imagined 
community on a global scale.  The transnational public sphere provides 
an existing framework to further develop the growing ties between the 
world’s peoples. 
Philosophers, starting with the Stoics and leading to a number of the 
liberal philosophers including Kant, Locke, and Rawls, have been cited 
for evidence of cosmopolitanism.129  As discussed herein, Habermas,130 
Anderson, Appadurai, Appiah, Castells, and Calhoun, among a litany of 
others, argue that globalization has produced a transnational public 
sphere that can form the basis for a new global, social, and cultural 
solidarity.131  Modern economic, political, and technological realities 
have created a globalized community of choice, clearly, but also one of 
necessity—one that requires us to engage in projects that help us not just 
imagine a better future but also work toward securing that better future. 
 125. Craig Calhoun, Imagining Solidarity:  Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the 
Public Sphere, 14 PUBLIC CULTURE 1, 147 (2002). 
 126. Id. at 157. 
 127. Id. at 171. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617, 619–20 (1997); 
Hugh Harris, The Greek Origins of the Idea of Cosmopolitanism, 38 INT’L J. ETHICS 1, 8–9 (1927); 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 4–7 (1997). 
 130. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization, 
NEW LEFT REVIEW, I/235, May–June 1999, 58, 46–59, available at http://www.newleftreview.net. 
 131. Calhoun, supra note 125, at 147. 
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The idea that our identities are no longer tied exclusively to one 
nation is convincing.  Anthony Appiah, however, cautions against an 
imperialistic, deracinating form of cosmopolitanism.132  Heeding 
Appiah’s caution, this Article argues that our identities are both personal 
and local, both local and national, both national and cosmopolitan:  that 
at least some small aspect of each of us is now cosmopolitan.  This 
Article adopts the framework Appiah calls “Rooted 
Cosmopolitanism.”133
Appiah has described the task of formulating the theory of Rooted 
Cosmopolitanism as a compromise between thick and thin identities.134  
Building on the work of Ronald Dworkin, Appiah analogizes the 
distinction between morality (what we owe others) and ethics (what kind 
of life is good for us to live) to the distinction between thick identities 
and thin identities.135  Thus, while we may have thick identities based on 
our close relationships with others or our membership in a particular 
community, this does not obviate the thin identities that result from our 
desire and necessity for a well-ordered society.  Rather, these identities 
impose dual loyalties that are not mutually exclusive, and are often 
blurred.136
Appiah describes the conflict between nationalists and cosmopolitans 
as resting largely on the perceived incompatibility of these dual 
loyalties.  He argues that the thick nationalist identity that recognizes 
and praises “special responsibilities” trouble cosmopolitanism because it 
apparently disrupts the development of a universal morality.  At the 
same time, cosmopolitanism bothers nationalists because universal 
morality allegedly undermines the role of “special responsibilities.”137  
However, as Appiah demonstrates, defenders of both cosmopolitan and 
nationalist ideologies have praised the duty owed to a universal 
humanity while simultaneously arguing that local action is the best way 
to further the goal of making the world a better place.138  In this respect, 
 132. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 214 (2005). 
 133. Id.  “Rooted Cosmopolitanism” is the title of the last chapter of The Ethics of Identity. 
 134. Id. at 230. 
 135. Id. at 231. 
 136. Id. at 233–36. 
 137. Id. at 239. 
 138. Id. at 240.  “Making the world a better place,” though not used explicitly in this passage, 
serves as a theme for the entire chapter.  Appiah introduces the chapter by describing his father’s dying 
words that as a citizen of the world, he had a duty to leave it better than he found it.  Appiah uses his 
personal history (English mother, Ghanian nationalist father) to serve as a backdrop for the idea that 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive.  Rather, he sees them as sharing 
intellectual foundations in that both involve “imagined communities” and the appeal for a more 
universal identity. 
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Appiah endorses Michael Ignatieff’s comment that “human rights has 
gone global by going local.”139  Thus, one can be, at once, a local, 
national, and cosmopolitan citizen. 
Having recognized these disputes between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism, Appiah seeks to find a common ground that can 
accommodate both special responsibilities and universalism.  He 
contends that the “basic human capacity to grasp stories, even strange 
stories, is also what links us, powerfully, to others, even strange 
others.”140
Cosmopolitanism presupposes the value of learning from different 
opinions, stories, and experiences.  Even if those differences do not 
eventually lead to agreement, they can lead to understanding.141  This is 
the essential goal of Rooted Cosmopolitanism:  interaction and 
discussion between “others,” even “strange others,” in the hopes of 
leaving the world a better place.142
David Beetham argues that the international human rights regime 
provides a template for the development of a cosmopolitan democracy, 
and claims that the human rights regime actually functions as a 
democratic institution currently.  He indicates that both human rights 
and democracy are universal values.  Though he recognizes that there is 
a major weakness in the human rights system (the absence of any 
effective enforcement mechanism), Beetham contends that international 
human rights organizations have created a sort of international public 
forum where national governments can be held accountable in the court 
of international public opinion.  Furthermore, he suggests that seemingly 
innocuous international treaties can have a dynamic that “drags member 
states along despite themselves” (presumably through the creation of 
CIL).143
Theoretical and empirical work on cosmopolitan identities is most 
active in the social sciences, as evidenced by the foregoing discussion.  
Legal scholarship, especially international legal scholarship, has 
incorporated these ideas as well.  For example, in Human Rights and 
World Public Order, Myers McDougal stated:  “The existence of a 
world community, in the sense of the long-term interdetermination of all 
individuals with regard to all values today is commonly recognized.”144
 139. Id. at 260. 
 140. Id. at 257. 
 141. Id. at 271. 
 142. Id. 
 143. David Beetham, Human Rights as a Model for Cosmopolitan Democracy?, in REIMAGINING 
POLITICAL COMMUNITY 58, 65 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998). 
 144. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 94. 
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Linda Bosniak, in Citizenship Denationalized, provides the argument 
that it is both desirable and empirically supportable to discuss the 
development and emergence of a type of global citizenship.145  She 
realistically emphasizes that national identities and nation-states are not 
going to disappear in the foreseeable future, but recognizes that scholars 
have made a convincing argument for the development of identities that 
transcend national boundaries. 
First, Bosniak inquires whether an emerging “postnational” or 
“transnational” community exists.  She recognizes the same issues raised 
by Beetham:  that the international human rights regime has some claim 
to this sort of community.  She also points to arguments that resemble 
those of Iriye and Habermas:  that there is an increased global activism 
that looks and acts like a global civil society.  This political activity, she 
argues, is one component of citizenship.  She also discusses citizenship 
in terms of “identity/solidarity,” echoing many of the social and cultural 
theorists discussed in this Article.  Having identified these arguments in 
favor of emerging global communities, Bosniak questions whether these 
new identities should be encapsulated in the term “citizenship.” 
Bosniak concludes by indicating that the term “citizenship” is 
important because it is a “powerful expressive term, one which conveys 
honor and recognition upon the social and political practices to which it 
is applied.  The debate over the term’s scope of application is, 
consequently, a debate over the scope and extent of recognition we will 
accord various nonnational forms of collective life.”146  She concludes 
that emerging global identities exist, and that describing those identities 
as “citizenship” represents an essentially ideological choice to advocate 
for further development of these transnational identities. 
VI.  CHANGING LAW TO ACCOMMODATE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES 
If we take seriously the idea that individuals have become at least 
partially cosmopolitan, and that society and citizenship has palpably 
changed in the face of globalization, it is appropriate to think about how 
law ought to respond to this changed circumstance.  That this rethinking 
is well underway is without debate, as indicated by the proliferation of 
literature struggling with new or changing forms of governance.147
 145. Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000). 
 146. Id. at 509. 
 147. See, e.g., Nancy Viviani, Regional Arrangements and Democratic Reform of the United 
Nations, in BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:  THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY 312 (Albert J. Paolini et al. eds. 1998) (stating that in the emergence of post-Cold 
War governments, “we are witnessing the transformation of traditional state structures, the rise of new 
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If, as so many scholars assert, individuals are now at least partly 
cosmopolitan, there is something amiss in the lack of participation 
individuals have in the process of forming the CIL of human rights.  The 
structure provided in brief by Lung-chu Chen for evaluating the role of 
the individual in international law is helpful here.148
A.  Individuals and International Law 
Chen’s function-oriented framework is highly instructive, as it reveals 
the uncomfortable disjuncture in international law that this Article aims 
to elucidate and attempts to address.  The functions filled by either 
states, individuals, or both in international law under Professor Chen’s 
framework are the following: prescribing, applying, providing 
information (intelligence), invocation, and appraisal.149
Professor Chen has suggested that the international law functions in 
which states continue to occupy the prominent role are those of 
prescribing and applying the law.  Individuals play important functions 
in other areas such as providing information or “intelligence,” promoting 
international law, invoking the law, and making appraisals thereof.150
However, Professor Chen also notes, and this Article concurs, that 
these traditional conceptions of the functions of individuals and states 
are not so neatly separated.  For example, individuals have long had a 
role in the prescription and application of international law.  The 
creation of custom “through the widely congruent patterns of people’s 
behavior and other communications” has served as a contribution to the 
prescribing function.151  In addition, to “invoke the authoritative 
application of transnational prescriptions, individuals have had and 
continue to have access to national courts; they are increasingly afforded 
access to transnational arenas of authority, notably in the field of human 
rights protection.”152
regions detached from global institutions, the erosion of the influence of global governments including 
the UN and the renewed importance of social, economic and political movements within and across 
states”); see also ART OF THE STATE:  GOVERNANCE IN A WORLD WITHOUT FRONTIERS (Thomas J. 
Courchene & Donald J. Savoie eds. 2003) (analyzing policy challenges presented by globalization as 
they relate to Canada); GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (Ann Marie Bissessar ed. 2004) (discussing 
the implications of globalization on the governance of small states such as Barbados, Trinidad, and the 
Caribbean states). 
 148. CHEN, supra note 78, at 76–81. 
 149. Id. at 80. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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B.  Individuals and Human Rights 
The literature on human rights treaties often refers to the fundamental 
shift that has occurred within international law as a result of human 
rights treaties.  Individuals rather than states are the subjects of these 
treaties.153  Human rights treaties address the rights of individuals under 
international law rather than the rights of states thereunder.  As 
mentioned previously, individuals are seen as stakeholders in human 
rights treaties and the issues addressed thereby, and are thus provided 
with opportunities to participate in the treaty formation process.154  
Similarly, treaty definition and interpretation continue to be informed 
through individual engagement with treaties after they have been signed 
and entered into force.  This engagement occurs through the activities of 
NGOs, or through the petitioning process available to individuals under 
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, or through the individual 
petitioning rights available under the European, American, and now the 
African systems for human rights.155  Thus, there is general agreement 
that the last fifty years have seen a paradigm shift in international treaty 
law such that the individual is now both a subject and an agent under the 
treaty component of international law.  CIL and, specifically for the 
purposes of this Article, the CIL of human rights has recognized no such 
paradigm shift.  Perhaps it should. 
C.  Individuals and the CIL of Human Rights 
The CIL of human rights, no less than treaty law, has direct effects on 
individuals.  It sees them as the subjects addressed by those provisions 
that have attained the status of CIL.  Unlike treaty law, though, there is 
no space in the traditional formulation of CIL for individual 
participation in the CIL formation process.  As a result, there is currently 
an uncomfortable disjuncture in the CIL of human rights.  Individuals 
are its subjects but are not seen as legitimate participants in its 
formation.  The chart that follows employs the functions-oriented 
framework described earlier to illustrate this incongruence.156
 153. The author would like to note that she acknowledges Professor Chen’s discomfort with this 
use of subject/object terminology and expresses sympathy with his discomfort.  They are used here 
because, despite their clumsiness, they are helpful in thinking about the gaps in traditional thinking 
about international law. 
 154. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 155. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
34, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221; The American Convention on Human Rights art. 44, July 18, 1978, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 46, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58. 
 156. For a brief discussion of these functions, see supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text. 
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FUNCTION 
PERFORMED 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES 
CIL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRESCRIBING States and Individuals States only 
APPLYING States and Individuals States only 
INTELLIGENCE States and Individuals States and Individuals157
PROMOTION States and Individuals States and Individuals 
APPRAISAL States and Individuals States and Individuals 
 
This traditional state-centric conception of CIL, at least within the CIL 
of human rights, is incongruent with models of participatory democracy. 
Robert Dahl, a modern political theorist, advances five criteria that 
are satisfied in a fully functioning democracy:  first, there is voting 
equality—each person may express his or her preferences; second, 
citizens have adequate opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking 
process; third, citizens’ preferences are informed or enlightened; fourth, 
the citizens set the agenda—they control the matters that are decided 
through the democratic process; and fifth, all adult residents are included 
in the citizenry.158  These criteria rest on a few assumptions, including 
the assumption that decisions binding on a group of people (e.g., a 
citizenry) should be made by members of that group.159  While scholars 
debate the issue of who may be included in the citizenry,160 there seems 
to be agreement that democracy is defined as a “government by the 
many—not by single rulers or by small oligarchies,” and that it requires 
“active, possibly continual participation of large sectors of the 
population in the political process.”161  A functioning democracy 
requires the active and direct participation of individuals.  Furthermore, 
a representative form of government does not diminish the claim that 
 
 157. Though individuals have been included here, the only individuals afforded a role in providing 
intelligence for CIL under the traditional formulation are “the most highly qualified jurists.” 
International lawyers sometimes also describe as “sources” the “judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,” mentioned in 
Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the Court, supra.  Those, however, are not sources in 
the same sense since they are not ways in which law is made or accepted, but opinion-
evidence as to whether some rule has in fact become or been accepted as international 
law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 102 (1987) and Reporters Note 1. 
 158. ROBERT A. DAHL, TOWARD DEMOCRACY:  A JOURNEY 61–88 (1997). 
 159. Id. at 59. 
 160. See, e.g., id. at 68–88 (arguing against the aristocratic or meritocratic view that only those 
with a high degree of knowledge and virtue ought to govern). 
 161. S.N. EISENSTADT, PARADOXES OF DEMOCRACY:  FRAGILITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE 7 
(1999). 
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democracy requires individual participation.162
It should be noted that, while political theorists disagree over the 
extent of involvement citizens ought to have in political 
decisionmaking,163 participatory democracy theorists believe that 
citizens should be directly involved in making political decisions: 
“The crucial issue of democracy is not the composition of the elite . . . .  
Instead the issue is whether democracy can diffuse power sufficiently 
throughout society to inculcate among people of all walks of life a 
justifiable feeling that they have the power to participate in decisions 
which affect themselves and the common life of the community.”164
Each of Dahl’s five criteria are useful in parsing what is meant by 
democratic participation.  This Article is not interested so much in 
voting rights and democratic participation as it is in other means by 
which individuals can participate in society—simply put, this Article is 
more concerned with theories of participatory democracy.  Dahl’s 
second and third criteria are particularly of interest here. 
In a fully functioning democracy, citizens have adequate opportunity 
to participate in the decisionmaking process.  It is admittedly difficult to 
conceive of the CIL formation process as democratic.  However, this 
need not be as difficult as it has been to date.  Among the major 
difficulties when trying to picture CIL formation as democratic is the 
fact that a vast number of individuals would need an opportunity to 
participate.  This Article does not purport to state how each and every 
adult individual would be consulted as to particular provisions of the 
CIL of human rights.  Pragmatically and politically, any such attempt 
may be difficult to achieve.  Rather, this Article simply asserts that if we 
have a choice between allowing individual participation for those 
 162. ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 159–61 (2001).  
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution realized that America could not be governed by a “direct 
democracy” in the sense of all the people coming together to enact laws.  Instead, a representative form 
of government, which Madison called a republic, would be needed.  This republic government, 
according to Madison, would “‘derive[] all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the 
people,’” and it would be “‘administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, or for a 
limited period, or during good behavior.’”  Thus, even in a representative government, individual 
participation is still required.  Id. 
 163. Donald W. Keim, Participation in Contemporary Democratic Theories, in PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICS 1, 9 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975). 
 164. Id. at 10 (quoting PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM 92 (1967)).  At 
the other end of the spectrum, revisionist theorists argue that citizens do not need to play a direct role: 
“The task of the citizen in revisionist theory is to assess regime performance and to register preferences.  
This is generally accomplished by indirect means.”  Id. at 9.  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
assessment of these theories and the examination of theories lying between these extremes is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  It can be said at this point, however, that it seems that all agree that individual 
participation—either directly or indirectly—is an essential requirement to democracy. 
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affected by the CIL of human rights, the choice ought to be in favor of 
increased individual participation. 
Dahl also states that, in a fully functioning democracy, citizens’ 
preferences are informed and enlightened.  This Article explains the 
necessity of a fully functioning judiciary to ensure active and informed 
dialogue on important legal issues.  The judiciary serves a crucial role in 
starting and informing dialogue among a citizenry.  The active discourse 
over the separations of powers concerning whether courts may interpret 
and utilize foreign and international law provides an excellent example 
of the courts’ power to stimulate such conversation.  The courts’ power 
to promote dialogue is perhaps even more evident when a court makes a 
controversial decision regarding individual rights.165  Once again, if we 
can choose between facilitating the judiciary’s role in protecting the 
democratic process through stimulating dialogue or, alternatively, 
disavowing such a role, the choice ought to be to encourage courts to 
create dialogue. 
McDougal’s observations of a wide diversity and great abundance of 
communication processes by which norms are created in the 
contemporary world do not weaken this assertion.166  McDougal 
describes the various methods by which individuals currently participate 
in communicating expectations and experiences regarding matters 
including policy, authority, and control.  He states, “it is a process of 
communication in this comprehensive sense which creates and maintains 
the contemporary human rights prescriptions.”167
McDougal’s observation is consistent with Habermas’s model of 
participatory and deliberative democracy, which asserts that legitimate 
lawmaking arises from the process of active deliberation among the 
subjects of law.168  It is also consistent with Rousseau’s view that direct, 
or deliberative, democracy was the only route to true freedom, as it 
allows individuals the ability to participate in making the laws to which 
they are subject.169
In a representative democratic society, few avenues exist for direct, 
individual participation in lawmaking.  Still, this Article submits that the 
emerging condition of cosmopolitanism presses us to rethink the CIL of 
 165. Examples abound, including controversies surrounding the pledge of allegiance, enemy 
detainees, gay marriage, abortion rights, and capital punishment.  For a further discussion of this idea, 
see infra Part VII. 
 166. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 264. 
 167. Id. 
 168. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 318 (1996). 
 169. See POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:  THEORIES, THINKERS, CONCEPTS 358 (Seymour Martin Lipset 
ed., 2001). 
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human rights such that individuals become not only the subjects of that 
law but also agents in its formation.  There are few venues available for 
individual engagement with CIL, but the ATCA serves as one of those 
spaces.  This makes it unusual and perhaps it is among the reasons it 
attracts so much interest and controversy.  The process of 
democratization, after all, is rarely contested. 
VII.  THE ROLE OF COURTS 
Current discourse about CIL does battle over the proper role of 
federal courts in interpreting CIL.  Some revisionist CIL scholars argue 
that federal courts are prohibited from interpreting CIL.170  A position 
that seeks to limit the channels through which individuals can engage 
with CIL is, within the framework of participatory democracy and 
cosmopolitanism, an anti-democratic position.  The project, instead, 
ought to be to increase sites of individual engagement with CIL.  The 
claim of this Article is not that the judiciary is better equipped than the 
executive or the legislature to engage with CIL.  Those are fine 
institutions—democratic in their nature as well—and fine sites for 
individuals’ indirect participation in the CIL formation process.  But the 
judiciary is part of the democratic model and ought not be excluded as 
proposed by some scholars who focus on the problems CIL might pose 
for American constitutional democracy in isolation. 
As Paul Diamond and others have suggested, an essential role of the 
judicial branch is to promote dialogue.  As we see during every Supreme 
Court term, controversial decisions promote heated discourse over the 
most pressing and controversial legal and political issues.  Under this 
view, when a court issues an opinion, we either come to accept the 
court’s decision, or the court’s opinion will mutate and change over time 
such that legal rules promulgated by the court come to fit more closely 
with our general conscience about what the law ought to be.  Diamond 
sees court rulings not as final judgments but as provisional rulings that 
foster an ongoing dialogue with the people.171  Accordingly, rather than 
ending public debate, court decisions actually help to decentralize and 
democratize the debate. 
The proliferation of literature on the ATCA and on substantive claims 
made thereunder certainly seems to substantiate Diamond’s theory of 
provisional review.  The amicus briefs filed in connection with the Sosa 
 170. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10.  This view is also present among Supreme Court 
Justices.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 171. PAUL R. DIAMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE OF 
PROVISIONAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 155 (1989). 
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litigation came from a variety of foreign sources such as the European 
Union, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation, and 
others.  Other briefs were submitted by international interest groups 
including foreign legal scholars, the World Jewish Congress, and 
international jurists.  After the decision, a quick search of international 
news stories related to the Sosa opinion provided ample evidence that 
the world is watching and talking about the ATCA.  Simply put, without 
the ATCA and litigation thereunder, international awareness and 
discourse about human rights, corporate social responsibility, and CIL 
would all be impoverished. 
Eliminating the ATCA or limiting its availability to plaintiffs through 
a substantive limitation of CIL or by claiming that application of CIL by 
federal judges is undemocratic will similarly diminish individual 
participation in the formation of CIL.  At a time when a significant 
criticism of international law is that it is not democratic enough,172 we 
ought not try to eviscerate the few tools available for such participation. 
Platforms such as the ATCA, which allow individuals the opportunity to 
engage with CIL and proliferate the potential sources to which one looks 
in making a determination about whether a particular right has attained 
the status of CIL, also have the potential benefit of mitigating the state-
action-versus-state-words problem that has plagued CIL and fascinated 
legal scholars.  But expounding on this is best left for another time. 
 172. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld stating: 
The antidemocratic qualities of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and other international governance organizations—their centralization, their 
opacity, their remoteness from popular or representative politics, their elitism, their 
unaccountability—are well known. . . .  World government in the absence of world 
democracy is necessarily technocratic, bureaucratic, diplomatic—everything but 
democratic. . . . 
. . . . 
  . . . What sets [America’s] teeth on edge [are] . . . binding agreements administered, 
interpreted, and enforced by multilateral bodies. . . .  America’s commitment to 
democratic self-government gives the United States good reason to be skeptical about—
indeed, to resist—international legal regimes structured . . . around antinationalist and 
antidemocratic principles. 
Reprinted in Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1492, 1497 (2004).  See also Eric Stein, International Integration an Democracy: No Love at First 
Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 489 (2001) (using the examples of the GATT/WTO system, NAFTA, and the 
European Union to demonstrate the democratic deficit to which many have pointed in the face of 
international integration). 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
It is important to clarify that the substantive human rights provisions 
that have attained the status of CIL may not change under this Article’s 
proposal.  In the near term, the short list provided by the 
Restatement173—genocide, slavery, extra-judicial killing, 
disappearances, and torture or inhuman treatment—would probably not 
be supplemented, depleted, or altered.  This is probably the way things 
ought to be. 
Especially in light of the requirements set forth in Sosa that claims 
under the ATCA be predicated on norms that are definable or specific, 
universal, and obligatory, the CIL of human rights is one of those spaces 
where “we do not go wrong here if we resist designating everything we 
should devoutly hope for a ‘fundamental right.’”174  Certainly an 
argument that CIL should be formed at least partially through the direct 
participation of individuals depends on a modest vision of which rights 
currently have attained and are likely to attain the status of CIL.  For 
example, any right that has been at the center of conversations about 
cultural relativism will not likely become a right as a matter of CIL in 
the immediate or short-term future.  A number of rights enumerated in 
human rights treaties also would likely not make the list.  There is 
simply not agreement amongst the people of the civilized world about 
the status of these norms.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
determine, as an empirical matter, which of the rights enumerated in the 
UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, or any of the other human rights 
treaties would be affected by official recognition of the importance of 
individual participation in CIL formation.  However, it seems unlikely 
 173. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 174. APPIAH, supra note 129, at 266.  See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1993); see also Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of 
Human Rights:  The Unfinished Business, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1999) (arguing against the proliferation of 
the calls for “new” international human rights).  Glendon contends that part of the genius of the original 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was its recognition of the cultural plurality of the United 
Nations’ member states and its thus deliberate avoidance of codifying overarching theoretical or 
philosophical principles, instead couching the rights in ambiguous and general terms in order to provide 
for agreement on central concepts while providing enough room for interpretation.  Glendon also 
displays hostility at the proliferation of calls for new rights, decrying the “trivialization of core freedoms 
by special interests posing as new rights.”  Id. at 8.  For Glendon, efforts to add to the list of rights by 
calling for new, specific rights undermines the widespread agreement ushered in the ambiguity of the 
original UDHR.  Phillip Alston has registered similar concerns.  See Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New 
Human Rights:  A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 609 (1984) (fearing that calls 
for new rights will undermine the established credibility of existing rights).  In contrast to the rights set 
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Alston notes that vigorous discussion and analysis 
have been absent from calls for new rights, leading to an “inordinate vagueness.”  Id. at 613–14. 
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that the list of human rights that compose the CIL of human rights 
would change significantly from the currently agreed upon list under the 
proposal set forth in this Article. 
Rather than suggest an expansion, contraction, or modification of the 
substantive norms that make up the CIL of human rights, this Article has 
attempted to convey the need to democratize the CIL formation process 
in order to afford the individual a participatory role in CIL formation.  
This democratization alone seems a worthwhile pursuit. 
The natural question then becomes “how would the individual 
participate?” As has been suggested in this Article, a provisional 
response is that the individual, in very limited instances, already 
participates through mechanisms like the ATCA.  Making the 
paradigmatic or procedural shift proposed herein may help the ATCA 
appear less anomalous or dangerous—as something that ought to be 
protected and propagated, rather than stifled, limited, or eliminated. 
